

Drift and Breaks in Labour Productivity

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This paper:

An investigation of changes in **equilibrium labour productivity growth** over the post-WWII era

- **Productivity measure:** output per hour worked
- **Countries:** U.S., Eurozone, U.K., Japan, Australia
- **Methodology:**
 - tests for breaks in the mean
 - the Stock-Watson (1996, 1998) time-varying parameters median-unbiased estimation method
- **Key results:**
 - in the **U.S.**, we identify both the 1970s' slowdown, and the 1990s' productivity resurgence
 - in the **Eurozone**, a marked slowdown since the 1980s
 - in the **U.K.**, a marked slowdown since the 1960s, and some weaker evidence of a further deceleration in recent years

Motivation:

- Productivity is key for
 - a society's long-run **standards of living**
 - crucial policy issues, like the future **solvency of pension systems ...**

Gordon (1999): *'day of reckoning of Social Security is postponed until 2072 if mean growth in output per hour is 1.84%; it is postponed until 2116 if mean growth is 2.6%.'*

→ My estimates of equilibrium growth of output per hour for U.S. business and non-farm business sectors as of 2005:3: **2.7%**

- **Monetary policy:**
 - **misperceptions** about equilibrium productivity growth may lead to **policy mistakes** → e.g., Orphanides and the Great Inflation of the 1970s ...
 - shifts in productivity growth are associated to shifts in the **natural rate of interest** → Laubach and Williams (2003)

The Data

United States

- output per hour in non-farm business and business sectors (1947:1-2005:3) and manufacturing sector (1987:1-2005:3)

Eurozone

- real GDP per hour, based on synthetic real GDP from Euro Area Wide dataset, and confidential ECB aggregate hours series (1980:1-2003:4)

United Kingdom

- real GDP per hour: official series (1971:1-2005:3) extended back to 1959:3 based on interpolated hours worked series
→ pre-1971 series less reliable, I will show results for both longer and shorter series ...

Japan

- real GDP per hour from the *Bank of Japan*

Australia

- output per hour in private sector and in the whole economy, from the *Reserve Bank of Australia*

Results from Tests for Breaks in the Mean

Methodology: basically, same as Bai and Perron (2003) ...

- test for breaks in the mean by regressing series on a constant
- use Newey-West (1987) to control for autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity of residuals

... **but:**

- I use both the Andrews (1993) *sup*- and the Andrews-Ploberger (1994) *exp*-Wald statistics
 - ➔ **exponential statistics well-known for being superior**
- **Bootstrap** critical values as in Diebold and Chen (1996)
- Use Bai's (1997) method of estimating multiple breaks one at a time, re-estimating each break date conditional on the others

Let's see the results ...

**Results based on the *exp*-Wald tests
(results based on *sup*-Wald are identical)**

Break dates and 90% confidence intervals	<i>exp</i> -Wald (<i>p</i> -value)	Sub-periods	Mean (standard error)
<i>U.S., output per hour, all persons, business sector:</i>			
1973:2 [1973:1; 1973:3]	2.43 (0.059)	1947:2-1973:1	3.27 (0.35)
1995:4 [1995:3; 1996:1]	4.59 (0.042)	1973:2-1995:3	1.44 (0.34)
		1995:4-2005:3	3.02 (0.26)
<i>U.K., real GDP per hour, whole economy (linked series):</i>			
1973:2 [1973:1; 1973:3]	2.37 (0.06)	1959:3-1973:1	3.69 (0.44)
		1973:2-2005:3	2.06 (0.27)
<i>Eurozone, real GDP per hour:</i>			
1995:2 [1995:1; 1995:3]	5.97 (0.024)	1980:2-1995:1	2.37 (0.18)
		1995:2-2004:4	1.12 (0.24)

**Not much
evidence of time-
variation ...**

**... breaks
identified for
only three series**

- a **marked decrease** in equilibrium productivity in both the **Eurozone** and the **United Kingdom** ...
- ... and a U-shaped pattern in the **U.S. business sector**, but without a return, post-1995, to the pre-1970s levels ...
 → results for U.S. business sector almost the same as those of Fernald (paper he'll present tomorrow)

Why are breaks identified for only three series?

- A possible explanation: changes may have been **too gradual** to be detectable via break tests ...
 - Cogley and Sargent (RED, 2005): ‘break tests have remarkably low power in the case of **random-walk time-variation** ...

Let’s see random-walk time-variation ... Two possibilities here:

- a **Bayesian** approach, in the spirit of Cogley-Sargent:
 - **good**: it allows you perfect control of heteroskedasticity, *via* stochastic volatility
 - **bad**: you have to start with a **prior** on the extent of random-walk time-variation ... which is not great
- The Stock-Watson (1996, 1998) **Classical** approach:
 - it allows you to **test for** and **estimate** the extent of random-walk time-variation ... which is great!!

Results Based on the Stock-Watson TVP-MUB Method

A brief outline of the Stock-Watson method ...

$$(1) \quad \pi_t = \mu_t + \phi_{1,t}\pi_{t-1} + \dots + \phi_{p,t}\pi_{t-p} + u_t \equiv \theta_t' z_t + u_t, \quad u_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

$$(2) \quad \theta_t = \theta_{t-1} + \eta_t \quad \eta_t \sim i.i.d. N(0_{p+1}, \lambda^2 \sigma^2 Q)$$

Following Nyblom (1989) and Stock-Watson (1996, 1998) we set $Q = [E(z_t z_t')]^{-1}$, and we estimate it as:

$$\hat{Q} = \left[T^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^T z_t z_t' \right]^{-1}$$

Under this normalisation, the coefficients on the transformed regressors follow a $(p+1)$ -dimensional standard random walk

→ λ is key parameter, as it governs the amount of random-walk drift in the model ...

Searching for random-walk time-variation, and median-unbiased estimation of λ

We follow Stock and Watson (1996, 1998):

- do an *exp*-Wald (*sup*-Wald) **test for a joint break** in μ and ρ —call the test statistic L^*
- **simulate (1)-(2)** conditional on a grid of values for λ
- for each simulation, do an *exp*-Wald (*sup*-Wald) test for a joint break in μ and ρ , thus **building up the empirical distribution** of the test statistic
- **MUB estimate of λ** is that value, λ_{MUB} , such that median of simulated distribution conditional on λ_{MUB} is equal to L^*
- deconvolute the PDF of λ_{MUB} *via* the procedure detailed in Appendix A
- compute confidence bands for TVP estimates of $\mu_t/(1-\rho_t)$ and ρ_t based on the Monte Carlo integration procedure

described in appendix *B*—adaptation to the case at hand of the Hamilton (*J. of Econometrics*, 1986) procedure


- in particular, we control for **time-variation** in the **volatility** of reduced-form innovations along the lines of Boivin (2004):
 - **test for multiple breaks** at unknown points in the sample in the innovation variance ...
 - ... when running the Kalman filter, impose the volatility breaks
- Why is controlling for changes in volatility so important?
 - Stock's (2002) comment on Cogley and Sargent's *NBER Macro Annuals* paper: 'you **don't control** for changes in volatility, you **systematically overestimate** the amount of random-walk drift ...'

Results:

	<i>exp</i> -Wald (<i>p</i> -value)	$\hat{\lambda}$	<i>sup</i> -Wald (<i>p</i> -value)	$\hat{\lambda}$
U.S., output per hour, all persons:				
<i>nonfarm business sector</i>	3.13 (0.061)	0.02241	14.78 (0.013)	0.03793
<i>business sector</i>	2.47 (0.117)	0.01897	8.26 (0.168)	0.01724
<i>manufacturing sector</i>	9.13 (0.001)	0.05172	24.50 (0.001)	0.05172
U.K., real GDP per hour				
<i>linked series</i>	2.557 (0.102)	0.02414	8.61 (0.142)	0.02241
<i>ONS-LFS series</i>	0.715 (0.699)	0	3.82 (0.705)	0
Eurozone, real GDP per hour	14.048 (0)	0.05172	32.920 (0.001)	0.05172
Japan, real GDP per hour	1.12 (0.454)	0.01379	4.87 (0.500)	0.00345
Australia: output per hour:				
<i>market sector</i>	2.08 (0.165)	0.03448	7.40 (0.210)	0.03103
<i>all industries</i>	16.84 (0)	0.05172	42.26 (0.000)	0.05172

- based on simulated *p*-values, **evidence of time-variation** is strong only for **Eurozone**, **U.S.** non-farm business and manufacturing sectors, and **Australia**, all industries ...
 - ... **but** a *p*-value greater than 10% should be regarded as strong evidence against time-variation only if we had very strong reasons for believing in time-invariance ...
 - ➔ not clear to me why this should be the case ...
 - ➔ **more reasonable** to assume time-variation and to estimate its extent ...
- Let's see some results

United States




A broadly U-shaped pattern over the post-WWII era ...

... very much in line with the traditional U.S. narrative of a productivity slowdown in the 1970s and a ‘new economy’ resurgence in the 1990s ...

Equilibrium productivity growth in 2005:3: 2.7%, 2.7%, 4.5%

→ for non-farm business sector, estimates near-numerically identical to those of Jorgenson-Ho-Stiroh (2004), 2.6% ...

United Kingdom and Eurozone



A collapse in the Eurozone

- equilibrium productivity in 2004:4 estimated at **0.9%**

In the **U.K.** a continuous deceleration since the 1960s


- no acceleration in productivity over most recent past ...
- ... equilibrium productivity in 2005:3 estimated at **2.0%**

How robust are these results?

- In both cases **hours** have been (partly) **interpolated**
- U.K. post-1971 (more reliable): $\lambda_{MUB}=0$


Let's see some results based on **filtering** of non-interpolated annual (Eurozone) and quarterly (U.K.) series ...

U.K. and Eurozone: raw series and HP trends



- **Eurozone:** the broad trend seems to be there...
- **U.K.:** $\lambda=1,600$ gives you too much trend variability; with a larger λ —e.g. $\lambda=40,000$ —you get results even ‘worse’ than those based on Stock-Watson ...
→ but both results suggest a **gentle decline** in recent years

Australia and Japan



Japan

- virtually no time-variation
- consistent with large simulated p -values (0.45, 0.50)


Australia

- clear acceleration in private sector, with *plateau* reached in mid-1990s ...
- ... more complex picture in whole economy


Summing up

- In the **United States**, the productivity acceleration is **undeniable**:

- detected based on 3 series
- **starts in the first half of the 1990s** in all three sectors
- interestingly, in all three sectors the acceleration seems to have **reached a plateau** in the last 2-3 years:



- a **convergence** between business and non-farm business sectors ...
 - not clear (to me) how to interpret this ...
 - in U.S., share of agriculture is broadly unchanged since the 1970s ...



In the **Eurozone**, the deceleration is **undeniable** ...

→ you may quarrel with the specific point estimate of equilibrium productivity growth—0.9 vs. 1.1—but the collapse is there ...

- In the **United Kingdom**, the picture for the most recent period is not 100% clear, but evidence points towards a gentle deceleration in productivity growth ...

Implications for monetary policy

- The **natural rate of interest** should in general be regarded as time-varying
- The **problems** discussed by **Orphanides** are a permanent part of the ‘macroeconomic landscape’

And therefore, a conceptually related question ...


‘How large is the permanent component of labour productivity growth?’

→ ‘What fraction of quarter-on-quarter change in labour productivity growth should be regarded as permanent?’

Let’s see, based on Cochrane’s **variance ratio** estimator ...

- compute confidence intervals *via* **spectral bootstrapping**
- only consider series with **more than 40 years** of observations
 - the ‘size of the unit root’ pertains to the infinite long run of a series, so you need very long series ...

Let’s see some results ...



Not surprisingly, a large **uncertainty** surrounding the estimates ...

In the U.S., about **3-4%** of the quarter-on-quarter change in productivity growth is estimated to be permanent

In the U.K., about **4-5%**

Table 4 Bootstrapped distribution of Cochrane's variance ratio estimator at the 20-year horizon (percentage points)

	Median	Mean	90% confidence interval
U.S., output per hour, all persons:			
<i>nonfarm business sector</i>	2.94	3.41	[1.91; 6.57]
<i>business sector</i>	2.93	3.44	[1.91; 6.74]
U.K., real GDP per hour, whole economy (linked series)	4.18	4.94	[2.33; 10.08]

→ definitely non-negligible fractions ...